Kosovo - what is wrong with negotiations anyway?

To hear the negative chorus of voices from Pristina - including the Albanians and the representatives of the Quint (the US, UK, Italy, France and Germany and including the EU and NATO) - it would appear that a fully negotiated settlement for Kosovo status would be the worst possible outcome. They all have vigorously rejected Serbia's suggestion of negotiations after the ICJ decision on Kosovo independence later this year. Why - in the 21st Century and the heart of Europe - are the leading Western democracies arrayed against a negotiated final status agreement?

The short answer is that the Europeans appear not to know what else to do as their attempt to define the outcome by fiat has not worked. The Balkans has always seemed to produce "too much history" for the rest of the continent to consume. In 1991, Europe's inability to help Yugoslavia to a softer landing allowed the conflict there to degenerate into ethnic warfare. Failure to intervene forcefully and urgently to stop the slaughter of civilians in Bosnia and Herzegovina - and especially at Srebrenica - still haunts Europe. And Europe still seems spellbound for this (hopefully) last act of the breakup of the former Balkans state.

The Kosovo issue has deep roots. Ever since the French Revolution and Napoleon unleashed upon the world the reality of the "nation," it has proved impossible to stop it spreading. Any group that comes to see itself as a nation - usually defined in relation to "who we are not" - will most likely at some point demand autonomy or independence. Since the passing of "divine right", political power has been legitimized on the basis of the "people". Though this may take the form of citizenship or class, the most powerful claim is that of blood. Once the claim of blood receives widespread acceptance within a group, it becomes very difficult to overcome or brush aside. In this sense, Kosovo independence was inevitable after 1999 and overdue by 2008, in the face of pent up Albanian demand to get out from under an international tutelage that had run its course. However, the mixing of peoples in the Balkans under the Ottomans - including in Kosovo - makes the fixing of boundaries complex and simple separation impossible.

In 2007, the great powers - all six of the Contact Group (the Quint plus Russia) - failed to settle Kosovo's final status. In response, the Quint decided they did not have to bargain with Belgrade and pushed the negotiator - former Finnish President, Martti Ahtisaari - to devise a "compromise" settlement package that they then sought to impose. The Albanians were not enthused about this package as it provided for an apparently strong form of decentralization for some of the non-Albanian enclaves and for a continued international role in overseeing their independence. They agreed because it was the price of Quint support for independence. But the Serbs, where they could and especially in the north, rejected the package as it recognized independence and put them under the rule of Pristina. After the electoral defeat of the Kostunica government and formation of a new one by President Tadic, the EU thought it would get help from Belgrade in forcing the Serbs to accept the deal. But the EU again seems to have underestimated the bond of blood, not least the political dynamics it creates. Tadic could not be seen to be giving Kosovo away even if he had wished. The EU's bullying tactics - allowing southern Serbs to be intimidated into accepting Kosovo institutions and continuing efforts to impose them in the north - further reduced his manoeuvring space.

So, unless Belgrade and the northern Serbs simply surrender, the Quint is in a bind. They keep the Albanians in-line - the issues of trans-border migration and crime being essential for the Europeans - in large part by promising them all of Kosovo and still cannot deliver. So they cannot be seen to accept the need for further negotiations, nor can they react forcefully when Pristina hints at an irredentist agenda of fomenting further ethnic division elsewhere.

To be fair, some may also see negotiations as simply heading for partition. Some argue that the precedent of ethnic partition would be bad for the Balkans and elsewhere (despite the fact that the separation of Kosovo itself is clearly such a partition). But this may represent more a lack of sufficient inventiveness rather than inevitability. Negotiations may offer the only way forward avoiding continued stalemate, renewed conflict or outright partition.

An emerging, if still minority, opinion within the EU supports further negotiations, perhaps in the context of a joint approach toward EU membership for Serbia and Kosovo. Recently there has been the suggestion of a possible solution in the form of a confederation of cantons for Kosovo. Though perhaps not practical in itself, it does raise the possibility of looking at a formula for shared or overlapping sovereignty. It might be instructive to consider the 1998 peace that finally settled centuries of conflict and war between Ecuador and Peru over territory they both claimed. In a jungle area both marked in blood, they accepted an arrangement offered by mediators that granted an area of one square kilometer at the site of the fiercest fighting (Tiwinza) on the Peruvian side of the border - and in the middle of a bi-national peace park - to Ecuador as a non-sovereign private property. This allowed Ecuador to erect a monument and fly their flag in a place where many of their soldiers died. Kosovo is not a jungle park but any future mediators might think broadly and imaginatively to help the two sides reach an accommodation both can live with. (US Ambassador Luigi Einaudi was instrumental in reaching the Ecuador-Peru agreement. Perhaps he can be urged to try again.)

The ICJ decision is unlikely in itself to settle the status issue. Negotiations are not the enemy. Simple insistence on there being nothing to negotiate cannot be the Quint's only response. Paraphrasing Elvis Costello, what's so wrong with peace, dialogue and understanding?

Gerard M. Gallucci is a retired US diplomat. He served as UN Regional Representative in Mitrovica, Kosovo from July 2005 until October 2008. The views expressed in this piece are his own and do not represent the position of any organization. You can read more of Mr. Gallucci's analysis of current developments by visiting http://outsidewalls.blogspot.com/

http://www.transconflict.com/News/2010/March/Kosovo_what_is_wrong_with_negotiations_anyway.php