Kosovo: A Hint of A Way Forward

I've noted in the past in this space that in the lead up to the ICJ decision, many people would be talking about Kosovo without really saying much. But every once in a while, there is a nugget of the real stuff in all that fools gold. Last week, in reaffirming Belgrade's view that there will be new negotiations on status, State Secretary for Kosovo Oliver Ivanović added an interesting detail. He reportedly said "I don't doubt that we'll arrive at technical negotiations, and I'm convinced that we'll also arrive at those main talks about the status." This suggestion of a two-step approach to setting the Kosovo question may be as important as the substance of what may eventually be discussed in the negotiations. It also potentially ties into the possibility of a compromise approach to the status question along the lines I suggested in Transconflict recently (Kosovo - divisible sovereignty).

Ivanović is a clever fellow, a Kosovo native and a self-created politician (beginning with his days as a Bridge Watcher). His suggestion that talks start with technical matters offers a way to work out practical arrangements - on matters including courts, telephones, utilities, returns - that could then be folded into an eventual overall political deal that could at least set aside the question of sovereignty if not completely settle it. It could work like this:

• Arrangements could be agreed to for allowing the opening of local Serb courts operating under UNSCR 1244 and applicable UNMIK regulation with a role for EULEX at the top to tie the local structure into an overall Kosovo justice system.
• The Serbian telecoms entities could be allowed to operate in Kosovo either through the granting of Kosovo license (commercial arrangements might be easier to make without bringing political issues into the mix) or if either side balks at this, under UNMIK license for providing service at least in Serb areas.
• The Serbs and Albanians of north and south Mitrovica - either working directly together in an equally balanced and non-political commission or under the banner and chair of UNMIK - could coordinate on practical issues such as improving the water, electricity and waste disposal systems along the shore of the Ibar.
• Pristina and Belgrade could discuss details of a possible Kosovo-wide framework for mutually agreeable and sustainable returns. This would almost certainly have to include some unbiased - and therefore probably internationally led - system for adjudicating property claims.

Discussions on these matters would likely be difficult and both sides might need prodding to engage in real dialogue. The Albanians might need special urging since they may still hold out hopes of winning the whole pie without giving anything up. But if these practical issues could be settled - and they need not all be done at once - then it would make subsequent questions of status either more tractable or perhaps less urgent.

For this to have a chance of success, the Quint countries supporting Pristina will have to become fully supportive. Typical of the problematic attitude that seems to have them trapped within their own conceptual limitations, the British Ambassador to Serbia reportedly explained to the press recently that the EU does not want negotiations because that would renew the conflict over Kosovo. This ignores the fact that the conflict over Kosovo does not need to be renewed as it has not yet ended. Belgrade has offered up some interesting possibilities to the international community, to reach a compromise through negotiations and to start with technical matters. It is clear that President Tadić wants to make a deal with the EU on Kosovo. But it is also clear he cannot simply give Kosovo away. The elements for an approach that can avoid partition - which the Economist aside, is not the only alternative to simply accepting independence - exist. The Quint seems reluctant to sign on now to negotiations, perhaps thinking it still premature to tip their hand. But hopefully they are prepared to get serious when the Court plays its cards. Any real return to conflict in Kosovo may otherwise be their fault.

http://outsidewalls.blogspot.com/2010/06/kosovo-hint-of-way-forward.html