Radical shift

Serbia's governing parties, split on the question of how to deal with the EU in the wake of Western recognition of Kosovo's independence, have agreed to hold a pre-term election in May. This appears to spell the end of the anti-Milosevic coalition, which opposed radical nationalists. The fault-line now is between parties putting Kosovo first and those putting the EU first. Although the latter won the presidential contest, they are unlikely to win a majority in the parliamentary poll. The hardline Serbian Radical Party looks closer than ever to gaining power.

The end of the line

Serbia's prime minister, Vojislav Kostunica, the leader of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), on March 8th announced that irreconcilable differences between the DSS and its pro-EU coalition partners, the Democratic Party (DS) and G17 Plus, necessitated an early election. The leaders of the other parties quickly agreed with the assessment. It seems likely that President Boris Tadic, the DS leader, will agree to dissolve parliament, setting the stage for a pre-term general election in May, most likely in tandem with municipal elections scheduled for May 11th.

The government has been brought down after less than a year in office by disputes following the February 17th declaration of independence by Kosovo's Albanian leadership, and recognition of this by the US and major European states. Mr Kostunica has refused to countenance any deepening of relations with the EU, unless it recognises Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. President Boris Tadic and the leaderships of the DS and G17 Plus also insist on Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo, but are unwilling to condition deeper EU relations on the EU acknowledging this.

This would appear to mark the end of the so-called democratic coalition, based around the DS and DSS, that toppled Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic in 2000. The coalition had been under strain for several years, as the DS was liberal and pro-EU while the DSS was conservative and mildly nationalist, yet it took Kosovo to trigger a split. The forthcoming election campaign will pit those parties that prioritise EU ties against those insisting that sovereignty over Kosovo comes first.

Kostunica's calculation

The prime minister's decision was probably influenced by three considerations. First, the ruling coalition is deadlocked on the question of how to approach the EU in the wake of Kosovo's independence. This has an impact on other policy areas, not least the domestic reforms needed to advance the country's EU integration.

Second, Mr Kostunica arguably has an interest in holding an election now rather than later in the year. A Gallup opinion poll conducted in early February showed 39.4% of decided voters supported the Serbian Radical Party (SRS); 37.5% were for the DS and G17 Plus; 10.3% for the DSS; and 5.4% for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) fell below the 5% threshold required to enter parliament. The widespread popular opposition to Kosovo's independence is most likely to boost the ratings of the SRS, SPS and DSS. However, this boost will probably wane over time. It is better for Mr Kostunica to go to the polls while resentment over Kosovo is still burning fiercely.

Third, Mr Tadic forced the issue by relaunching staunchly pro-EU rhetoric last week, under pressure from pro-EU elements within the DS. This undermined the little common ground shared by president and prime minister, and their respective parties.

EU referendum

Opinion polls show that around 70% of Serbia's population is in favour of the EU, although an equal number are opposed if the price is the loss of Kosovo. As they begin the campaign, the DS and G17 Plus are sure to portray the election as a choice between Serbia joining the EU and turning its back on European integration. In this quest, the EU is likely to lend some support by arranging for Serbia's stabilisation and association agreement (SAA) to be signed in late April. Until now, the Dutch government has opposed signing, saying that Serbia is not co-operating fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, but in the current situation it is imperative for the EU to do all it can to support like-minded forces in Serbia. Although this amounts to the EU meddling in the election, and could be viewed by some Serb voters as a cynical attempt to manipulate the ballot, it is nevertheless likely to help Mr Tadic. He can sign the document and thus show that his course has delivered substantive progress; however, he will be unable to secure ratification for the SAA in the current parliament.

The fact that Mr Tadic, by appealing to the electorate's pro-EU aspirations, scored just over 50% support in the presidential run-off in February, against Tomislav Nikolic of the SRS, will offer the DS and G17 Plus some slim hope. Together, they would not need an absolute majority: in parliament, they will be able to count on the support of the representatives of the country's national minorities, who are guaranteed seats, and probably also the support (at least tacit) of the LDP. In their more optimistic moments, the DS and G17 Plus could perhaps envisage faster EU progress without the encumbrance of Mr Kostunica and the DSS in the government.

Has the Radicals' time come?

In practice, however, the DS and G17 Plus seem to have a very slim chance of winning a majority or even getting close. Given the post-February 17th political climate, they could struggle to match the vote share predicted by the early-February Gallup poll. Without the DSS, the DS and G17 Plus probably cannot command a parliamentary majority, even with their smaller allies.

An election in these circumstances will boost the parliamentary strength of the SRS, which is already the largest party in the legislature. It has drawn support away from other nationalist parties in recent years and, under Mr Nikolic's leadership, has softened its image somewhat. As well as campaigning on the Kosovo issue, the SRS will benefit from widespread economic dissatisfaction and perceptions of corruption within the government. The DSS too will play the Kosovo card, but it can only suffer among voters most swayed by the state of the economy and corruption in government.

This election is likely to give the SRS its best chance to govern since the fall of Milosevic. It is set, once again, to be the largest party in parliament. However, its performance in recent elections and its standing in the latest opinion polls suggest it will not be able to claim a majority on its own.

Nevertheless, the SRS's chances of gaining coalition partners have never been so good. Although the Gallup poll gives the SPS less than 5% support, it is too early to write off the party-especially because of the Kosovo issue, which currently dominates the political agenda. If the SPS were to rise above the 5% threshold and so enter parliament, its support would put the SRS close to a ruling majority.

Kostunica the kingmaker again

The major difference in this election is the stance of the DSS. In the past it has refused to deal with the SRS, but this can no longer be taken for granted--particularly as the DSS's relations with the DS and G17 Plus seem beyond repair. Ahead of the election, there is no prospect that Mr Kostunica would agree to a coalition with the SRS, for he needs to differentiate himself from the Radicals in order to attract votes. Once the election is over, he will most likely have a simple choice: a move into opposition or a deal of some kind with the SRS.

The SRS would be a much larger party than the DSS; so logically Mr Kostunica would have little chance of remaining prime minister at the head of a DSS-SRS coalition. However, Mr Kostunica managed to hold on to the premiership following the 2007 election, which gave the DS 50% more seats than the DSS. Perhaps, cast once more as kingmaker, he can again retain the crown for himself. Mr Kostunica has more experience than Mr Nikolic and could argue that he is better able to prevent Serbia from slipping into isolation as it digs in for a long battle with the EU and US over Kosovo. If not, he might opt to support a minority SRS government rather than forging a coalition.

EU-Serbia ties were in any case set for a prolonged period of difficulty as a result of Kosovo's independence, as the pro-EU parties in government cannot finesse the Kosovo question when taking concrete steps towards accession. Yet matters could soon get worse: absent a near-inconceivable reconciliation between Messrs Kostunica and Tadic, the pro-EU parties won't have the seats to form a government. The main rationale for the EU's recognition of Kosovo, as set out in policy documents, was to help stabilise the Western Balkans. So far, recognition has only created instability in that neighourhood's largest state.

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