Problems with Kosovo recognition
Ottawa's formal recognition of Kosovo (backed by the Liberal opposition) means more than a simple acknowledgement of facts on the ground. It also means that Canada approves of the province's unilateral declaration of independence – a declaration that offends not only the Serbian constitution but the United Nations.
(Thomas Walkom, Toronto Star) Thursday, March 20, 2008
At one level, Ottawa's decision to recognize Kosovo is a non-issue. Backed by the muscle of NATO, the ethnic Albanian majority that dominates the statelet is clearly in charge. In purely practical terms, therefore, it makes sense to deal with those running this particular piece of Balkan real estate. We may not approve of the way Kosovars achieved independence (this argument goes), but they are there and must be dealt with.
That is the practical viewpoint. And it would indeed make sense if Stephen Harper's Conservatives - like, say, those of former prime minister Brian Mulroney - conducted their foreign affairs on a purely practical basis.
But they do not. This Prime Minister has insisted on injecting what he calls a moral element into foreign policy - which, in diplomatic terms, means he will deal only with governments he approves of.
Which is why Harper will not deal with Hamas, even though it is a legitimately elected government controlling the Gaza Strip.
However, injecting morality into politics carries risks. Ottawa's formal recognition of Kosovo (backed by the Liberal opposition) means more than a simple acknowledgement of facts on the ground. It also means that Canada approves of the province's unilateral declaration of independence - a declaration that offends not only the Serbian constitution but the United Nations.
And when gleeful Quebec separatists say this sets a precedent for their province to unilaterally secede, they are right. In international relations, precedents do matter - which is why Spain, Indonesia and China, all countries with their own separatist movements, have so far not recognized Kosovo.
Certainly, there is no simple answer to the Kosovo problem. NATO's 1999 invasion, while designed to prevent what some feared might be a wholesale slaughter of Kosovar Albanians, succeeded only in replacing one form of oppression with another.
Before 1999, ethnic Albanians were the victims; after the invasion, ethnic Serbs took their place.
Yet it's worth remembering that NATO received international approval for this invasion only by promising not to dismember Serbia. As Charles Simic writes in the latest New York Review of Books, that promise was revealed as hollow when the U.S. began building a giant military base in Kosovo. Albanian Kosovars, he writes, realized quickly that with Washington on side they would never have to accommodate either Serbia or the Serb minority in their own province.
And so they did not. Any resolution short of separation was forestalled. Last month's unilateral declaration of independence became inevitable.
The loss of Kosovo has further demoralized Serbia, shaken its efforts to join Europe and invigorated xenophobes. It may be true that most Serbs have no interest in even visiting the country's so-called Kosovo heartland. That does not mean that its loss is without cost. The cliché "Balkan powder keg" exists for a reason.
For Canada, recognition of Kosovo's right to secede means two things. First, we are turning our backs on the UN and on very specific commitments that we and other NATO countries made not to dismember Serbia. Second, we are lending our imprimatur to any ethnically based province that decides to unilaterally break away from a larger state.
Harper says the Kosovo situation is unique. Bob Rae, the newly recycled Toronto Liberal MP calls this precedent argument so preposterous that it is "an insult to the intelligence." Would that they were right. Unfortunately, they are not.
