Kosovo in limbo
THIS WEEK marks the 10th anniversary of NATO's entry into the war-torn Balkan province of Kosovo.
(Scott Taylor, Chronicle Herald) Tuesday, June 23, 2009
I can still vividly recall those violent and terror-filled days as I packed up my gear and fled north amidst the Serbian refugees and the withdrawing Yugoslav security forces.
For 78 days the allied NATO air force - including Canadian aircraft - had pounded infrastructure targets throughout Kosovo and Serbia in a failed attempt to force the Serbs to capitulate and accept the terms U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had proposed at the 1999 Rambouillet peace talks.
What the nearly $13 billion worth of explosive ordnance dropped in that campaign failed to achieve was any substantial downgrading of the Serbian military forces; more importantly, it did not diminish the will of the Serbian people to resist.
Knowing the futility of their air defences, the Serbs I interviewed had been anxiously awaiting the start of a ground invasion so they could engage NATO soldiers on more even terms in the narrow mountain passes of Kosovo. That contested entry scenario was something NATO leaders were definitely anxious to avoid and they were forced to the bargaining table in Kumanovo, Macedonia.
After days of protracted negotiations, UN Resolution 1244 was ratified by both parties on June 10, 1999. Two days later the ceasefire went into effect.
Despite NATO's proclamations of a decisive victory, the terms of 1244 conceded to all the demands which had been put forward by the Serbs at Rambouillet. During the interim, Serbia would still control the checkpoints of Kosovo and a small number of Serb security forces would remain to protect the centuries-old orthodox churches and monasteries.
The most important element of 1244 was the formal recognition that Kosovo was the sovereign territory of Serbia. When drafted and signed, Resolution 1244 rendered all the death and destruction inflicted during the 78-day bombardment absolutely unnecessary. The Serbian will to resist had forced the mightiest military alliance in history to concede to their demands.
But NATO had no intention of abiding by the terms of Resolution 1244. The signing was just a ruse to get Serbian air defences out of Kosovo and NATO ground troops in without a fight.
NATO planners had no intention of letting any Serbian troops remain in Kosovo, no intention to ever let them return and no intention of disarming the Kosovo Liberation Army.
Incumbent in the ceasefire agreement, NATO was to provide a secure environment for both ethnic Serbs and ethnic Kosovar Albanians in the province when they assumed responsibility for security.
Instead, as expected, NATO troops did little to curtail the wave of violence inflicted on Serbs by the emboldened Kosovar Albanians. Unable to protect themselves, some 200,000 Serbs fled Kosovo. Crammed aboard a Belgrade-bound bus, I witnessed first-hand the Albanian mobs assaulting our convoy with rocks and bats.
Not surprisingly, over the past decade the continued presence of NATO troops in Kosovo has not prevented inter-ethnic violence. Rather than clarifying its future, the February 2008 unilateral declaration of independence by the Albanian Kosovars only complicated things further.
Following America's lead, Canada and 50 other countries recognized that independence. Serbia refused to acknowledge that declaration and is supported by Russia, China and another 138 nations.
For now, Kosovo remains in a diplomatic limbo, unable to join the United Nations, economically dependant on foreign aid and occupied by foreign troops for the foreseeable future.
The irony is that the U.S. State Department considers the Kosovo intervention a "success" when compared to their subsequent fiascos in Iraq and Afghanistan.
