Kosovo - what to do with the north, ad interim

We have seen over the last several weeks EU policy for northern Kosovo twisting in the wind.  Since the apparent collapse of the EU "northern strategy" - drafted in the office of EU Special Representative to Kosovo, Pieter Feith - the main players on the Quint side (US, UK, Italy, Germany, France plus the EU and NATO) have backed away somewhat from suggestions that force might be used to bring the north under control.  Instead, they have increased pressure on Belgrade to cooperate on Kosovo while launching a second track with a "kinder and gentler" approach to bringing the north under control.  It seems that the new EU envoy to the north, Italian Ambassador to Pristina, Michael Giffoni, is trying to entice the northern Serbs into cooperating with the newly opened "EU House" in north Mitrovica with the lure of "practical improvements" for all communities.  He suggests leaving political issues aside for now.  The EU apparently has even sought to convince Pristina to accept Serbian judges designated by Belgrade for reopening the northern court.  (Serbia still has outstanding questions concerning which law the court would apply - UNMIK or Kosovo - and if the jurisdiction would include the Albanian-majority south and thus require Kosovo Albanian judges in the north.  In any case, the Albanians oppose any concession to the Serbs and the EU continues to allow them a veto in this regard.) 

Giffoni has tried to distance himself from the "northern strategy", even as Feith continues to reassure the Albanians that the Ambassador's efforts are part of the EU's support for it.  But the EU appears to have taken on board the notion that direct confrontation with the northern Serbs is unlikely to lead to quick progress.  For one thing, the past tough rhetoric on "parallel institutions" and the leaked details of the northern strategy made it impossible for the Serbian government to be seen as cooperative.  The new effort to appear to be putting aside political objectives while stressing practical assistance seems aimed, at least in part, at allowing Belgrade to accept a "status-neutral" EU presence in the north.  If the locals accept this "toe in the door," then next steps in the northern strategy could yet unfold.

This is unlikely to succeed in the sense of leading to any near-term acceptance by local Serbs or Belgrade of any EU efforts to link the north to Kosovo institutions.  The EU faces as well further challenges in the form of Serbia-called municipal elections on May 30 for north Mitrovica (and Novo Brdo) and continuing disputes over attempted Albanian "returns" to north Mitrovica.  How they handle these could cause more conflict.  At some point, the international community will need to face the issue of finding a more comprehensive approach to the north, acceptable to the majority Serbs, that can serve in the interim to help regularize life there while status remains unresolved. 

There are two reasons for this.  One, the ICJ decision - whenever it comes - will not by itself resolve status.  It is likely that there will still have to be, at some point, an agreement on Kosovo's status with Serbia and within the UN Security Council, and perhaps even negotiations including both Belgrade and Pristina.  Two, the north has been for too long already without key institutions, including a fully functioning judiciary, but also a regularized structure for delivering and charging for public utilities (water and electricity) and overseeing land and property issues.  Some might also wish to include a customs mechanism in this category.  This all suggests the usefulness of implementing a status-neutral approach to filling the current institutional vacuum, one based on practical cooperation with the Serbian institutions already functioning in the north.  This would simply mirror the international acceptance of the fact of "independent" Kosovo institutions south of the Ibar.  For the south, part of the international community recognizes this independence and fully supports the Pristina government while the UN itself tacitly accepts the fait accompli of the UDI by staying, as much as possible, out of the way of institutions that are technically "parallel" to it under UNSCR 1244.  Serbia has not been given a veto over the international community's approach to Pristina and Kosovo should have no veto over the international approach to the north.  

Approaching the north in a status neutral manner means working with the existing local institutions there and encouraging and supporting their efforts to normalize daily life in their communities.  A key piece would be reopening local courts to deal with criminal and civil matters in cooperation with the local police.  (Police remain unable now to even write traffic tickets as there is no local court to adjudicate them.)  This could be achieved through reaching agreement with Serbia on a court with jurisdiction limited to the north, applying UNMIK regulations and law, with judges and other officials chosen by the Serbs but appointed by UNMIK and operating under the UN flag.  It would also include working with municipal officials on maintenance and development of utilities and required infrastructure, metering usage and charging fees (to be used locally), and regulating property issues.  It might also include a customs regime operating as part of UNMIK with fees, if collected, being retained in escrow or being used in the north for local requirements.  All this would simply replicate what is already being done with Kosovo institutions in the south.

It seems unlikely that the EU will be able to go this far.  Fortunately, UNMIK remains fully present in the north in each of the four municipalities.  It is the logical entity to represent and apply UN authority in this part of Kosovo under 1244.  The EU's northern strategy aims at the departure of the UN.  But unless the EU can produce a miracle breakthrough with the new approach represented by Ambassador Giffoni, it would seem time for the job to be given back to the UN.  

Gerard M. Gallucci is a retired US diplomat. He served as UN Regional Representative in Mitrovica, Kosovo from July 2005 until October 2008. The views expressed in this piece are his own and do not represent the position of any organization.

http://www.transconflict.com/News/2010/April/Kosovo_what_to_do_with_the_north_ad_interim.php