Regional security and the tyranny of deadlines

In Britain and several other Western European countries, the caricature of the First World War-a civilisational calamity forced upon decision makers by railway timetables-is etched into public conscientiousness. It is an unhelpfully shallow caricature with incontestable elements of truth. It has also had a most unhelpful result: ridiculing our predecessors and persuading us that we today know better. But of course, we don't. In diplomacy as in war, schedules and ‘processes' continue to force decisions out of governments before they are wise enough or prepared enough to take them.

Over the next few months in Central and Eastern Europe, two deadlines might have strategic consequences whether we desire them or not: 10 December 2007, the date when the six nation Contact Group must report to the UN Secretary General about the Troika's efforts to resolve Kosovo's final status; and March 2008, the month in which, according to the current constitution, a successor to President Putin must be elected. Just as these consequences begin to unfold, NATO's Bucharest summit will take place. Whilst it has no formal deadlines to respect, many well and ill intentioned people view the summit as a deadline in itself. It will convene at a time when paradigms about Russia and its need to ‘adjust' to the enlargement process are starkly changing. When it comes to the next stage of this process-а Membership Action Plan-developments in Georgia and Ukraine are giving NATO pause for thought. Can NATO and these two candidates act in ways that prevent a pause from becoming a retreat? In other words, can they act with deliberation and in concert? They will need to resist very powerful distractions in order to do so.

Russia: the need for perspective

In the West, it is disagreeable but no longer controversial to make the following points. Russia's mood today is both resentful and self-confident. The country is committed to the ‘strict promotion' of its own national interests, and it feels entirely principled about promoting them. (In Putin's words, ‘Russia has earned a right to be self-interested'). What is more, it now has means at hand, not only energy (which has an all-European dimension), but two others: an aggressive intelligence presence and a limited, but increasingly methodical re-profiling of military capabilities for rapid intervention, particularly in the Black Sea and Caspian regions. Whether the issue is Kosovo, support for sanctions against Iran, US anti-ballistic missile defences in Central Europe, observance of arms control treaties or the resolution of frozen conflicts, the Kremlin will not be swayed by ‘the merits of the case', but will demand a quid pro quo for any concession it makes. Convinced that it has repeatedly been weakened and deceived by the West, the quid pro quos that matter are geopolitical: agreements that advance (and recognise) Russia's primacy in the former Soviet Union and its ‘equality' (de facto right of veto) in wider matters of European security. The West is not only waking up to the realisation that the post-Cold War partnership is over; it is beginning to ask whether the post-Cold War status quo could be undermined or revised.

Yet soon we might have reason to recall the old axiom: ‘Russia is never as strong or as weak as it seems'. The first reason is becoming unnervingly plain as we approach March 2008. Succession was the most problematic feature of the Soviet political system and, for all its apparent awesomeness, the clearest sign of its fragility. Has anything changed? Today's succession process is not only a weak link in its own right; it threatens to open every fissure that President Putin's rule has concealed. After all, Putin has not only concentrated power in the Kremlin, but rivalry: rivalry between individuals and clans that dominate the economy and control instruments of surveillance, investigation and armed force. The reverberations of this rivalry are not only being felt by Russians but by others. Today (as Fyodor Lukyanov argued back in January), ‘pressure to recruit the international factor is strong'. Has the October CSTO [ODKB] summit in Dushanbe (with its emphasis on pre-empting coloured revolutions and collective peace-keeping ‘in any hot spot of the world') not already done this in a most conspicuous way? Ditto the appointment of former SVR chairman Sergey Lebedev as Executive Secretary of the CIS? It is neither a good time for Russians interested in the country's more fundamental problems, nor for those who believe in cooperation with the West. Finally, it is not a good time for those who seek to engage Russia from outside.

Logically, these conclusions should enhance NATO and EU partnership with other regional actors, and it should lead to a strengthening of these actors' capacity. But will this endeavour have priority, or will it be held hostage to more distant and more petty interests?

Kosovo and the logic of consequences

The mantra of the so-called ‘Quint' [kvintet] (the five Contact Group members minus Russia) is that ‘Kosovo's supervised independence should not create any precedents'. This outwardly dogmatic statement can be justified on at least four grounds:

• History. Unlike Abkhazia and Nagorniy-Karabakh, the inhabitants of Kosovo (90 per cent of them Albanian) are not the ethnic cleansers but the ethnically cleansed, returned to their homeland under UN and NATO protection;
• Law. Kosovo is a UN protectorate. The frozen conflicts in the south Caucasus are not. The process of determining Kosovo's final status occurs within the framework of United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 and the plan of the Secretary General's Special Envoy, Martti Ahtisaari;
• Rights. The Ahtisaari Plan maintains a multi-ethnic community in Kosovo and secures (to quote the International Crisis Group) ‘maximum concessions' for the Serb minority (7 percent of the population) ‘which go far beyond European standards'. No parallel with Nagorniy-Karabakh or Abkhazia;
• Prospects. In the south Caucasus conflict zones are ruins; Kosovo's economic prospects are bright and European integration prospects in sight;

Yet the opponents of Kosovo's independence can also justify their position on four grounds:

• History. At least 100,000 Serbs were driven from their homes at the conclusion of the conflict in 1999 despite NATO ‘protection';
• Law. The Ahtisaari Plan is blatantly inconsistent with UNSC 1244, which reaffirms ‘the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia' and calls only for ‘substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo';
• Rights. What guarantee exists that the minority provisions of the Ahtisaari Plan will be implemented, given the UN's failure to implement provisions of 1244 that Albanians oppose, its failure to protect Serbs in 1999 and, once again, in the riots of 2004 (which wounded 900)?
• Future Prospects. What is the likelihood that Kosovo will remain an independent state rather than a transitional entity on a path to absorption by Albania?

In truth, the argument will not be resolved by argument, but by those who have the power to put their political convictions into practice. If the Kosovo leadership carries out its threat to declare independence unilaterally on 10 December, the question is what will happen, not what should happen. What will happen within the Quint [kvintet]-united in support of ‘UN supervised independence', but not on recognition of unilateral independence? What will happen inside Kosovo and between Kosovo and Serbia (including Serbia's paramilitaries, who have threatened immediate intervention), and what will NATO's role then be? What will happen in the Republika Srpska, where 77 per cent say they will back secession from Bosnia-Herzegovina if Kosovo declares independence? What will happen inside Macedonia if the Ohrid agreement shatters and Аlbanians come under attack, and how will the EU, NATO and the Republic of Albania respond? And if the Kosovars are let down, will they just shrug their shoulders and go home?

The questions are relevant even if the turbulence extends no further. For fresh instability in the Balkans will only provide another reason for the West to keep Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia in the antechamber.

Yet Russia's leadership has hinted that if its wishes (and those of Serbia) are defied again, then turbulence will go further, and recognition of separatist entities in the south Caucasus will follow. But will such recognition really advance the interests of Russia when (as Sergei Markedonov recently argued), the ‘Balkanisation' of the north Caucasus is already so well advanced? We therefore advance the hypothesis that Russia will not do what it threatens, but do what it does best: make life more disagreeable than it already is. Or to restate the proposition: nothing will be done with Russia's cooperation, and nothing can be done without it. Are we prepared for this eventuality? Is it one that we are obliged to accept?

Getting Georgia right

Someone might have sprung a trap for the President of Georgia, but he walked into it with blind confidence. Warnings about his style of leadership have been given: first (and quite early) by some of his more experienced supporters, then by Georgian and Western NGOs, then by those who had become his opponents and finally, on 4 October, by the Secretary General of NATO himself. Like his equally calculating, but cooler and more methodical Russian foil, Vladimir Putin, Mikhail Saakashvili appears to suffer from diminished apprehension of danger. Psychological explanations aside, there are two political ones. First, Saakashvili is a beneficiary of the Western propensity to ‘pick winners', and whilst the Secretary General's warning was clear, it was late. Second, Saakashvili has legitimate reasons to be pleased with himself. Despite the Russian blockade, Georgia now has a vibrant economy. Institutions have been reformed, too selectively, but with real result. There is tax revenue as opposed to mere theft. Corruption is a recognised problem with recognised solutions and at least some visible progress. In no country does major reform fail to bring discontent. But the discontented need recognition, respect and answers. These things have not been visible.

Russia has been visible, but not in the present crisis. The question (which Saakashvili answered with characteristic hyperbole) is whether it has been an invisible protagonist. It has every incentive to be. Georgia is no longer a corroding despotism but a credible candidate for MAP. But does Russia have the means? In contrast to Ukraine, Georgia's political culture has become solidly anti-Russian, and 80 percent of the electorate supports NATO membership. In a country where links to Russian interests-not to say intelligence interests-risk instant discreditation, Russia has relatively little to play with. Nevertheless, Russian interests, particularly in the sphere of business, remain unavoidable, all the more so in an economy which remains far too opaque for the country's own good. As a reputed friend of Boris Berezovskiy, Saakashvili's principal foe, the oligarch Badri Patarkatsishvili is most unlikely to be a tool of the Kremlin, but he does appear to be connected with prominent business circles in Russia. Where there is business in the former USSR, there is intelligence. That reality leads to a more apposite question: does Russia have the knowledge to cause trouble in Georgia? Very possibly so, and it has worked overtime to acquire it. That it played a part in this drama is also possible. Yet the drama's successful denouement does not depend upon better defence against Russia, but better governance.

This point has not been lost on Saakashvili's Western interlocutors, who have done much to sober him in the past few weeks-and it has not been entirely lost on Saakashvili, who has begun to listen. Fortunately, after months of unreserved support and weeks of intemperate criticism, Western opinion has become more sober as well. Very possibly, Saakashvili's political methods would bounce him out of any Western government. But which opposition leader is more democratically minded, more competent and less corrupt than he is? In Georgia as well as Ukraine, the question is not ‘what is the Western standard', but ‘what standard and what tempo of progress can one reasonably expect'? There as well, the key deficit is not one of people, but of institutions that have the legitimacy to represent people and the competence to act. The affair that rudely began with Okruashvili's allegations is significant not because it has exposed the deficiencies of the President, but because it has exposed the gap between Georgia's aspirations and the political culture it has. The question is not whether this realisation delays MAP, but whether it strengthens Georgia and the West's commitment to it. Today a realist can allow himself to be optimistic on both counts.

NATO and ukraine: the issues ahead

Today NATO has much to re-examine. Contrary to the view that it remains a Cold War institution, the fact is that it has evolved too much. It moved east on the new age assumption that Russia would adjust and gradually join us in addressing common (and distinctly soft) security problems rather than decide to pose a distinct set of hard and soft security problems itself. We now find ourselves confronting a zone of Realpolitik in Partner countries and some unnerving active measures in aspirant countries and new member states. To state the obvious, not all NATO allies are well prepared for this.

But what is NATO's likely response to be? It is most unlikely that the Alliance would close the door that it has opened and recognise Russia's right to make decisions for others. A ‘grand bargain' at the expense of small states would see NATO's influence plummet. It would produce a deep rupture of the Alliance and undercut the legitimacy of the Euro-Atlantic project; it would create demoralisation, uncertainty and instability across the Black Sea and Caspian regions; it would reward a Russia ‘dizzy with success' and vindicate a paradigm of security that is outmoded, distrusted, damaging to Russia's neighbours and harmful to every tendency in Russia that the West seeks to encourage. Whilst some allies might contest some of these points, they would need to argue openly and persuasively to create a new consensus or block the established one.

But it is possible that NATO will pause. In principle, that might be wise. The Alliance needs an opportunity to do what has not been adequately done: re-examine its surroundings, think about the relationship between cause and effect and about the adequacy of the tools at hand. Reculer pour mieux sauter [otstupat', chtobiy nastupat' silnee] is the motto that should guide such a process. But in practice, such a pause risks being seen as a change of course rather than a consolidation of it. In a world where actions communicate intentions-and in a region of recklessly self-confident actors-it is difficult to communicate strength by pausing, and the Alliance should have no illusions about this.

Ukraine and Georgia dare not leave these deliberations to NATO alone. In an Intensified Dialogue, there needs to be the frankest possible dialogue, even pressure. Yet there are good and bad ways of applying pressure.

The worst way Ukraine could apply pressure on NATO is to arrive at the December Foreign Ministers meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission without an Annual Target Plan for 2008, without a fully formed government, without a unified view about defence and security policy, but with a portfolio of arguments about the need for MAP in Bucharest..

The best way for Ukraine to apply pressure would be for Ukraine's president and prime minister to demonstrate a clear commitment to put the country first and the 2009 elections second. That entails speaking with a single voice about national defence and security policy: defence reform and peacekeeping, security sector reform and its financing, energy policy, public information and NATO membership. NATO will never offer MAP to a country that does not want it. But pause or no pause, NATO will never abandon a country that embraces its principles, fulfils its commitments and believes in itself.

[The views expressed are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the thinking of the Ministry of Defence or Her Majesty's government]

http://www.mw.ua/1000/1550/61313/

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